# ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AS A SOURCE OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

Andrew Klein, Ph.D.
American University of Sharjah
School of Business & Management
Sharjah, UAE

## Abstract

This study examines the types of strategies and operating cultures of organizations in terms of their effectiveness at the individual, work-unit, and organizational levels of analysis. The framework focuses first on the relationship between the type of strategy adopted by organizations and their operating cultures, based on contingency or "fit" theories proposing that different cultures are appropriate for different types of strategies. The theoretical framework used in this study also focused on the relationship between organizational culture and effectiveness. This relationship was considered in terms of both "adaptive" theories of cultures—which propose that certain types of cultures promote effectiveness regardless of environmental and strategic factors --and contingency theories—which propose that such strategic factors moderate the relationship between culture and effectiveness. This paper presents a summary of the research efforts.

**Statement of the Problem**

The objective of this paper is to promote our understanding of how the operating cultures of organizations are related to their business strategies and contribute to their performance. The theoretical model presented in the paper views organizations as sets of critical resources that enable firms to compete (Barney, 1991). Within this framework, performance differences across firms can be attributed to variations in their capabilities and resources, the latter of which importantly includes organizational culture. If an organization's resources are valuable, rare, difficult to imitate and non-substitutable, they provide the basis for sustainable competitive advantage. Competitive advantage, in turn, should promote effectiveness and generate above average rates of return for the organization.

However, organizational contingency theories and strategic choice models (e.g., Child, 1972) posit that resources and type of strategy interact to produce results. Pfeffer notes, for example, "The conventional wisdom, taught in numerous human resource courses in business schools and frequently stated in articles, holds that management practices need to be contingent on the firm's particular product strategy" (1998, p. 56). Following this conventional wisdom, organizations employ both tangible resources, such as financial and physical assets, and intangible resources, such as human resources and culture, in the formulation and implementation of their selection of strategic type. Intangible are more likely than tangible resources to bequeath a competitive advantage because they tend to possess the characteristics of being rare and difficult to imitate (Barney, 1986; Hamal & Prahalad, 1990). Socially complex resources, such as culture, are the most unique of all. Thus, following the contingency approach, managers are expected to tailor their practices and create a culture that would complement their chosen strategy. Though not necessarily endorsing this approach, Pfeffer summarizes this position as follows:

> **"Firms pursuing a "high road" strategy based on service, quality, or product differentiation need to follow high-involvement or high commitment sets of management practices; those firms pursuing a strategy based on cost-minimization should pursue a more control-oriented, Tayloristic strategy." (Pfeffer, p. 56,1998).**

This perspective suggests not only that organizational effectiveness depends on the fit between strategy type and culture but also that managers must create the appropriate structures, systems, technologies, and human resource capabilities (skills and qualities) to communicate and reinforce behavioral norms that are supportive of the strategy (Cabrera & Bonache, 1999). These factors are critical for shaping the firm's operating culture and rendering it complementary to the strategy being implemented.

This contingency approach to strategic management, however, is inconsistent with adaptive theories of culture (Kotter & Heskett, 1992), which propose that high involvement and flexible cultures are appropriate for all types of organizations. Empirical support has been provided for this position by a series of studies employing survey-based measures of organizational culture. For example, research by Cooke and Szumal (2000), Glisson and James (2002), and others has suggested that Constructive cultures (which promote adaptability) are consistently related to effectiveness and Passive/Defensive and Aggressive/Defensive cultures (which detract from adaptability) are either unrelated or negatively related to effectiveness. This inconsistency can be exemplified by considering the two distinct types of strategies proposed by Miles and Snow (1984): (1) "prospector" strategies, which involve gaining advantage by producing innovative and high quality products and (2) "defender" strategies, which involve cost leadership and gaining advantage by producing at a low cost. On the one hand, prospector strategies call for the high-involvement management and human resource practices that reinforce the type of adaptive and constructive cultures that Kotter and Heskett view as effective. On the other hand, defender strategies call for control-oriented practices that reinforce non-adaptive and defensive cultures that have been shown to be less effective (Cooke & Szumal, 2000). Porter (1990, 1985) proposes a similar dichotomous set of strategic types, which he labeled "differentiation" versus "low-cost." Though defensive cultures may facilitate the implementation of defender or low-cost strategies, they simultaneously have a negative impact on individuals and teams, which, in turn, is likely to suppress organizational performance regardless of the proposed "fit" between strategy type and culture. The present study does not intend to resolve this inconsistency in the literature but instead focuses on the relationship between type of business strategy and culture while emphasizing effects at the unit (or work group) and individual levels.

**Background of Organizational Culture**

Organizational culture has been defined in many different ways in the literature, but most definitions have tended to focus on shared values, beliefs, behavioral norms and the artifacts that are present in organizations (Schein, 1985; Sathe, 1983; Cooke & Rousseau, 1988). The literature has emphasized the importance of system-level behavioral expectations and empirical studies have examined the patterns of behavior that result from shared meanings.

Constructive cultures, as defined and operationalized in Cooke and Lafferty's (1987) Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI), encourage members to be, among other things, flexible and adaptive in response to changing environmental conditions. Constructive cultures are those in which members are encouraged to interact with others and approach their work in ways that will help them meet their higher order satisfaction needs. These cultures are characterized by norms and expectations for Achievement, Self-Actualizing, Humanistic/Encouraging, and Affiliative behaviors (Cooke & Szumal, 1993, p. 1302). While Constructive cultures promote individual motivation, cooperation and collaboration, and adaptability, Defensive cultures, in contrast, promote or implicitly require behaviors that work against adaptability. The Organizational Culture Inventory distinguishes between two sets of Defensive cultures: Passive/Defensive and Aggressive/Defensive. Passive/Defensive cultures, in which members believe they must interact with people in ways that will not threaten their own security, are characterized by norms and expectation for Approval-oriented, Conventional, Dependent, and Avoidant behaviors. Aggressive/Defensive cultures, in which members are expected to approach tasks in forceful ways to protect their status and security, are characterized by Oppositional, Power-oriented, Competitive and Perfectionistic norms (Cooke & Szumal, 1993).

Empirical studies have consistently shown that, across organizations, Constructive norms are positively related to criteria of effectiveness and that Defensive norms are negatively related, or at best, unrelated to such criteria (Cooke & Szumal, 2000; Glisson & James, 2002; Klein, Masi, & Weidner, 1995). The positive impact of Constructive cultures appears to be relevant to all types of organizations, regardless of the type of strategies they have chosen to implement (Joyce & Slocum, 1990; Delery & Doty, 1996).

**Business Strategy: A Contingency View of Generic Strategies**

Contingency approaches to strategy have been around since the 1970's (Miles & Snow, 1978) and are inherent to the adaptive view of strategy (Porter, 1980, 1985). The contingency view was originally introduced in the strategy arena as the "structure-strategy-performance" paradigm prevalent in institutional economics. Thus, the generic strategy literature has been based on the contingency approach for some time.

Porter proposed that the efficacy of generic strategies is contingent on industry structure (Porter, 1980, 1985). He suggested that cost advantage and differentiation stem from industry structure, although he never fully explained this link. He did suggest that cost leadership and product differentiation imply substantially different organizational configurations: "The generic strategies differ in dimensions other than the functional differences noted above. Implementing them successfully requires different resources and skills. The generic strategies also imply differing organizational arrangements, control procedures, and incentive systems…. The generic strategies may also require different styles of leadership and can translate into very different corporate cultures and atmospheres. Different sorts of people will be attracted." (Porter, 1980, pp. 40-41).

Strategic management as a field of general management is concerned with formulating and implementing strategies, goals, objectives, policies and programs designed to achieve competitive success. From the perspective of strategic management, a firm's success depends on getting everyone from the top of the organization to the bottom performing activities that make the business successful. Success also depends on integrating the type of strategy that was selected by executive management with the members who must execute it, and assuring that those members behave in ways that are consistent with the strategy in their daily work lives (Schuler, 1992). Industry-specific, or *business* strategies are used within specific industries or markets. They are distinct from corporate strategies that examine the actions organizations take in determining which markets and product lines they will be in.

This line of thinking suggests that less successful firms are characterized by management systems that never quite get integrated towards a clear purpose or goal. Their performance measures may not be reinforced by reward or recognition systems; their staffing and management development practices may not target the right competencies; their work process or organizational design may not be capable of delivering up to expectations. The point here is that, no matter how well designed performance systems are, they still have to be filtered through the vagaries of human behavior and social systems, and thus cannot be assured of producing expected results. To achieve expected results, it seems logical that the performance systems need to be integrated into an operating culture that is appropriate to the business strategy so the systems and technology (such as job or work design) can link organizational goals and individual performance. Thus, the measurement effort optimally is aligned with the organization's goals and integrated with its culture.

**Firm Resources and Competitive Advantage**

Barney (1991) argues that the best approach for studying competitive advantage is to address a firm's strengths and weaknesses. This "resource-based view" is in contrast to the traditional focus on a firm's opportunities and threats (i.e., an environmental view). Barney suggests that resources can offer an organization a competitive advantage if they are helpful in confronting environmental threats, are rare in the competitive marketplace, and cannot be perfectly imitated or substituted for by competitors. This view is consistent with the universalistic perspective on organizational culture in that it proposes that a healthy

culture can represent a critical resource. This approach also extends to other human resource management practices and activities that a firm may utilize.

In order for a firm's culture to provide sustained competitive advantage, it must be imperfectly imitable, among other pre-conditions (Barney, 1986). An easily imitable culture is subject to replication which mitigates any competitive advantages that other positive cultural characteristics may provide (such as being "rare" or "valuable.") If one firm's cultural characteristics are easily transferable to other firms, then these attributes cannot, by the definition of the resource based view, be a source of sustained competitive advantage.

Although it seems apparent that the characteristics of Constructive cultures can be developed in virtually any organization, this does not imply that Constructive cultures are homogeneous. It is a fundamental characteristic of anthropology that all cultures are, to an extent, unique. This unique feature of organizational culture is what is inimitable, regardless of whether the norms are Constructive or Defensive.

Human resource management systems can be used to facilitate the development of organizational competencies. Among these are 'managerial competencies' involving management's ability to articulate a strategic vision, 'input-based' competencies which address a firm's human and capital resources, 'transformational' competencies that concern the ability to transform inputs into outputs, and 'output-based' competencies that refer to the firm's invisible, strategic resources, such as culture, reputation, product or service quality, and customer loyalty. These competencies can provide an organization with a sustained competitive advantage consistent with the resource-based view of strategic management (Lado & Wilson, 1994).

Based on their assessment of competitive opportunities and internal resources, firms are theorized to select generic business strategies with which to compete (Miles & Snow, 1978; Porter, 1980). Porter's (1980) model suggests that firms may adopt a generic strategy of being a "low-cost" competitor or a "differentiator," while Miles and Snow's framework (1978) provides as generic strategies "prospectors" or "defenders." Both models also propose 'middle-path' alternatives, plus situations where firms fail to select a clear strategy at all. The characteristics associated with Porter's "low-cost" strategy line up with Miles and Snow's "defender" strategy, while Porter's "differentiation" strategy parallels Miles and Snow's "prospector" strategy. These generic approaches to business strategy suggest that there are optimal ways for firms to compete in the external environment given their internal characteristics. These theoretical frameworks look at the external environment, such as industry structure (e.g., Porter's "Five Forces" model, 1985), and attempt to determine what the appropriate competitive posture would be for respective competitors. These competitive postures are known as "strategic types" and they refer to the basic business strategy with which a firm chooses to compete in a given product market. By combining the external and internal perspectives, we are able to see how external forces shape strategic choices.

In the context of strategic choice, a firm's culture can be "valuable" if it rewards risk taking and creativity and is in an industry where it is important to innovate and introduce new products. Sony and 3M are examples of firms that need to be very innovative to survive and therefore have sought to develop behavioral norms that encourage innovation (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). These firms' technological skills, coupled with innovative behavioral norms, have enabled them to respond to new environmental opportunities; in other words, their cultures represented valuable assets.

Conversely, the recent past has provided many examples of firms in the same industry that have been unable to compete, usually due to being unable to adapt to changing conditions. Where Sony thrived, Zenith floundered. Where Nucor and Wal-Mart prospered, USX and Sears struggled to survive. Whereas Sears' strong, tradition-bound culture may have prevented the firm from recognizing and exploiting new opportunities in the retail industry, Wal-Mart's lean, flexible and entrepreneurial culture enabled it to recognize and implement new strategies for discount retailing.

In determining the relative "value" of a culture as an organizational resource, it is necessary to examine and link the firm's internal resources and capabilities with the external opportunities and threats. This suggests that organizational resources are only valuable when they exploit external opportunities or neutralize

threats. By combining the business strategy models of Miles and Snow with the "resource-based view," the idea of a "valuable culture" as a resource can be examined. From a practical perspective, the results could help firms isolate potential opportunities and threats that can be exploited by leveraging the characteristics of a valuable culture. Organizational cultures are socially complex internal phenomena. Social systems are very difficult to imitate across organizations, and for this reason (inimitability) a valuable culture is a unique resource. Socially complex resources include non-patentable resources like reputation, trust, friendship, teamwork and collaboration, which are hard to duplicate. Thus, managers could potentially benefit from new information that can help them to understand and create appropriate cultures; such cultures can represent a powerful and enabling capability to exploit environmental opportunities and threats (Barney, 1986).

**Leadership and Culture: The Impact of Leadership on Operating Cultures**

A recent study concluded that "the aggregation of HR agendas and activities impacts business performance by approximately 10% (Brockbank, Ulrich, & Yakonich, 2002). The authors defined "business performance" by comparing the financial performance of specific organizations against that of major competitors over the last three years. It is important to keep in mind that financial performance is shaped by numerous factors, including international currency rates, financial market movements, new products and patents, and other significant macroeconomic trends in various markets, mergers and acquisitions, and changes in governmental regulatory policies. Nevertheless, if 10% of business financial performance is statistically related to HR competencies and practices, that is a significant finding. It is important for future research to explore certain of these factors and activities in terms of their impact on the firm's operating culture.

Recent research by Pfeffer and Sutton (2000) emphasizes that leaders are critical in turning knowledge into action. Even though it may be apparent to members of a firm that there is a gap in their ability to implement a given type of strategy, if the leadership competencies are not present, change is unlikely to occur. The result may be 'talk' substituting for 'action'. Instead of doing something about problems and opportunities, meetings, discussions, and planning seem to be all that is produced in place of action. This lack of action inadvertently creates a passive and avoidant culture. Leaders often reward "talking" or sounding smart, which, as Pfeffer and Sutton point out, is what is rewarded in both business school and meetings. To counter this, firms need to put in place leaders who have personal experience and intimate knowledge of the working processes of their firm. Knowledgeable leaders, particularly those with both task-oriented and people-oriented skills and styles, create positive cultures in their organizations (Bennis, 1989).

**Culture and Performance**

The cumulative result of the past twenty years of studies in organizational culture provides strong support for the notion that, "culture matters." Although the managerial literature has generally accepted the idea the organizational culture is positively linked to organizational outcomes, it is still an emerging research area and empirical data are still somewhat rare. This author's own empirical research suggests that cultures based on Constructive norms can foster the motivation and cooperation—and ultimately, the innovation, creativity, risk-taking behaviors—that organizations with prospector or differentiation strategies need to engage in new product development and get them to market first. The results also suggest, however, that these norms can foster the reliability and consistency that other firms (i.e., those with defender or low-cost strategies) need to maintain their quality and competitiveness. In fact, the results are so strong at the individual, group, and organizational level that it raises a serious question about why Constructive cultures have failed to proliferate in practice.

The overriding question in the field of management is "what is the impact of culture on business performance?" As previously emphasized, leadership in high performing firms builds strong and healthy cultures driven by the firm's need to execute the type of strategy it has selected based on its market demands. The dominant cultural foundations that effective leaders apply to create high performing cultures include market connectivity, organizational unity, immediate responses to market signals, and strategy execution. As implied above, leadership is responsible for assuring that there are appropriate mechanisms to disseminate these cultural norms, including comprehensive upward and downward communications

channels, visible and comprehensible promotion and incentive criteria, effectively designed jobs, and widely shared exposure to customer feedback. To the extent that leaders effectively shape the appropriate cultural norms, they are translated into managerial and employee behaviors. In fact, it has been noted that culture management has displaced change management as the leadership practice that has the greatest impact on firm performance (Brockbank, Ulrich, & Yakonich, 2002).

One of the main reasons why culture research has been so prominent in recent years is because it holds out the promise that culture may be a factor in enhancing the effectiveness of individuals, groups, and organizations. This path from culture to performance ostensibly occurs because (a) the "right type" of behavioral norms will motivate workers, increase morale, and enhance commitment to the firm's strategy type and objectives (Kilman, Saxton, & Serpa, 1985); (b) Cultural values *may* clarify the behavioral norms of members (Schwartz & Davis, 1981); and (c) Through these activities, culture can enhance the firm's adaptability and therefore its effectiveness and performance (Kotter & Heskett, 1992).

Calori and Sarnin (1991) carried out a field study examining the link between corporate culture and economic performance. They operationalized culture as espoused values, instead of behavioral norms, but their results were positive nevertheless. They hypothesized relationships between values, management practices, and economic performance and concluded that strength of agreement around norms and cultural attributes appeared to be correlated to firm growth, while the correlation between profitability and cultural attributes was less significant. Other researchers are applying the culture construct in a search for an ideal "marketing culture," exploring the possibility of a relationship between a firm's culture, its marketing strategy, and profitability. Webster, for example, (1993) found a significant relationship between service firm marketing culture, measured along six dimensions, and firm profitability.

The suggestion that there is a link between culture and financial performance, in contrast to behavioral effectiveness, is controversial. Some scholars argue that it may be impossible to substantiate such a link (Siehl & Martin, 1990). They suggest that there are conceptual and methodological "flaws" behind attempts to link culture and financial performance that, in turn, render the results empirically inconclusive (Siehl & Martin, 1990). They opine that the most that culture research can hope to do is establish relationships between culture and psychological and behavioral outcomes, such as motivation, team effectiveness, and commitment.

**The Relationship Between Motivation and Cultural Norms**

According to Klein (2003), Constructive cultural norms greatly enhance individual motivation while Aggressive and Passive/Defensive norms reduce motivation levels. The nature of a firm's culture provides important insights regarding a firm's behavioral expectations for people, and they set forth the psycho-social environment. The respondents reported that the Constructive norms, favoring collaboration, creativity, and risk-taking behaviors, fostered high levels of motivation, which, in turn, should be reflected in member satisfaction and intention-to-stay.

Aggressive and Passive/Defensive cultural norms were negatively related to member motivation, according to the results. These Defensive cultures promote thinking and behaviors that discourage change efforts, support the status quo, discourage effective information exchange, and, in the process, generally reduce the motivation of individual workers.

**The Relationship Between Group Level Outcomes and Cultural Norms**.

Constructive norms are strongly and positively related to group-level measures as well (Klein, 2003). In contrast, Aggressive- and Passive/Defensive norms are significantly and negatively related to effective teamwork within units, coordination across units, and the quality of products/services at the unit level.

The results highlight the differences in managing intra- and inter-group processes in Constructive versus Defensive cultures. The Defensive cultures are characterized by the "throw it over the wall" mentality, in which each of the functional units in, for example, the product development process do their part of the project and "throw it over the wall" to the next functional unit. They, in turn, fling it over the wall, and so

on down the line. In contrast, the organizations with Constructive cultures reported strong department-level quality and a high level of inter-unit coordination. The behavioral norms in these work units include strong personal initiative and moderate risk taking, challenging rules that don't make sense or fit, cutting across functional boundaries, plus sharing responsibilities throughout the project team. These intra- and inter-group outcomes seem to be desirable for all organizations, regardless of their strategic directions.

**The Relationship Between Organizational Level Quality and Cultural Norms**

The research results provided clear insights regarding the importance of cultural norms to the perceived quality of a firm's products and services. Though the survey data were collected at the unit level, the results from this perspective indicate that the firms with Constructive cultures managed to engage the entire organization to build a cohesive focus and collective commitment to delivering high quality products and/or services. This occurred through a combination of management commitment to a healthy, Constructive culture and practices and policies that reduced resistance to customer service, continuous improvement and change. The firms with Constructive cultures manage to send signals to members that encourage teamwork, the development of knowledge, skills, and abilities, and a commitment to meeting customer needs. The result tends to be products and services rated high by both employees and managers.

These results reinforce the idea that organizational culture can serve as a powerful tool for enhancing product quality. Behavioral norms and expectations are the ether through which managements sends its strategies, plans, hopes and objectives to its members. By helping us understand why members in firms behave as they do, culture is a valuable tool for aligning that behavior with customer-focused and quality–oriented norms. As the pressure to attain higher quality standards continues to increase, the challenge of developing effective levels of collaboration, creativity, and innovation will fall to the keepers of the cultural flame.

**CONCLUSION: Leadership, Trust and Organizational Culture**

The results of this body of knowledge suggest that cultural norms appear to have a fairly consistent impact on quality, regardless of the strategy adopted by the organization. The results indicate that the type of strategy is not a factor in explaining the relationship between culture and quality. Constructive norms appear to be positively related to quality and defensive norms negatively related to quality, regardless of organizational strategy.

The recent collapses of Enron, Tyco, and World-Com have raised the issue of how organizations foster an atmosphere that inspires trust and credibility (Tate, 2002, p85). Ironically, Enron's leadership cited their culture as one of their great strengths:

**"One of our great successes at Enron was creating a culture, an environment, where people could try to achieve their God-given potential. But certainly I wanted it to be a highly moral and highly ethical environment. I have done the best job I can of following that wherever I have been." (interview with Ken Lay, Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2002, p1).**

With such good intentions, how did the behavior of these firms turn so malignant? Pfeffer and Sutton (2000) in their discussion of the main causes of the knowing-doing gap cite "fear" as one of the main obstacles to effective strategy implementation. Specifically, they argue that when fear reigns in the organization's culture, employees become unwilling to express their ideas and act on the knowledge and information that they have obtained. In spite of Ken Lay's espoused desire to create a "highly moral and highly ethical environment", to use his words (and is there any reason for us to assume that he was a cynical, amoral, or otherwise venal individual who didn't mean what he said?), the operating culture of Enron seemingly became one where top managers lived in dread of failing to achieve the financial targets that would make them, and their insider-colleagues, rich. In terms of the OCI styles, this suggests that fear leads to the emergence of Avoidance norms, where members avoid taking responsibility for anything risky, where they might be blamed, and punished, for failure. In the final analysis these sorts of situations reflect a failure of leadership to understand how to manage the cultural norms.

Fear is a powerful emotion and interferes with people's ability to act on their knowledge. In spite of the emphasis on "driving fear out of the workplace" (Ryan & Oestreich, 1991) during the TQM revolution, fear is still very much alive and doing well. It may be that fear is what many managers instinctively turn to when times get rough, sort of a psychic fall-back position. Leaders who foster an atmosphere based on fear often get a lot of press coverage in the business media, i.e., Chainsaw Al Dunlop, and the CEOs of Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom were all hard-charging and intimidating personalities. Although these types of leaders can somtimes generate attractive short-term financial results, the longer-term impact on the operating culture and employee attitudes is often, ultimately, negative, fostering lethargy, avoidance of responsibility, and a lack o f commitment. For organizational leaders to manage beyond fear, they must learn to treat mistakes as sources of learning (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2000). The tools available to the leadership to accomplish this are communication, understanding, shared control, and other Humanistic-Encouraging and Affiliative behaviors. These are what can build a culture free of dysfunctional fear and distrust.

In conclusion, this research was based on the proposition that the performance of organizations is attributable to organizational culture. This belief was tested through the collection and analysis of hard empirical data. The central question, does organizational culture have a positive effect on organizational performance, and does it vary based on the type of strategy the firm adopts, resulted in a split outcome. The results of this research suggest that cultural norms appear to have a fairly consistent impact on quality, regardless of the strategy adopted by the organization. The results indicate that the type of strategy is not a factor in explaining the relationship between culture and quality. Constructive norms appear to be positively related to quality and Defensive norms negatively related to quality, regardless of organizational strategy.

**References**

1. Barney, J. 1986. *Organizational culture: Can it be a source of sustained competitive advantage?*

**Academy of Management Review.** 11: #3, 656-665

2. Barney, J. 1991. *Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage.* **Journal of Management.** 17: 99-

120.

3. Bennis, W.G., 1989. **On Becoming a Leader**, Addison-Wesley, Reading Mass.

4. Brockbank, W., Ulrich, D., Yakonich, D. 2002. *The new HR agenda: 2002 Human Resource*

*Competency Study,* University of Michigan Business School.

5. Cabrera, E.F., Bonache, J. 1999. *An expert system for aligning organizational culture and strategy.*

**Human Resource Planning,** 22(1), 51-60. Tempe, AZ.

6. Calori, R., Sarnin, P. 1991. *Corporate culture and economic performance: A French Study.*

**Organization Studies,** Berlin, 12 (1), 49-75

7. Child, J. 1972. *Organizational structure, environment, and performance.* **Sociology,** Jan. 1-22

8. Cooke, R.A., Lafferty, J.C. 1986. **Level V: Organizational Culture Inventory (Form III).** Plymouth, Mi. Human Synergistics

9. Cooke, R.A., Rousseau, D.M. 1988. *Behavioral norms and expectations: A quantitative approach to the assessment of organizational culture.* **Group & Organization Studies.** 13, 245-273

10. Cooke, R.A., Szumal, J.L. 1993. *Measuring normative beliefs and shared behavioral expectations in organizations: The reliability and validity of the organizational culture inventory.* **Psychological Reports**: 72, 1299-1330.

11. Cooke, R.A., Szumal, J.L., 2000. *Using the Organizational Culture Inventory to understand the operating cultures of organizations.* **Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate.** Sage Pub.

12. Glisson, C. & James. L.R. 2002. *The cross-level effects of culture and climate in human service teams.* **Journal of Organizational Behavior**, 76-794.

13. Hamel, G. , Prahalad, C.K., 1994. **Competing for the Future**, Boston, MA. Harvard Business School Press.

14. Kilmann, R.H., Saxton, M.J., Serpa, R. 1985. **Gaining control of corporate culture.** San Francisco, Jossey-Bass

15. Klein, A.S. Organizational Culture and Business Strategy: Culture as a Source of Competitive Advantage, 2003 Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago,

16. Klein, A.S., Masi, R.J., Weidner, C.K., 1995. *Organizational culture, distribution and amount of control, and perceptions of quality: An empirical study of linkages.* **Group and Organizational Management. , 20.** 122-148

17. Kotter, J.P., Heskett, J.L. 1992. **Corporate culture and performance.** New York. Free Press

18. Lado, A.A., Wilson, M.C. 1994. *Human resource systems and sustained competitive advantage: A competency-based perspective.* **Academy of Management Review**: 19, #4 699-727.

19. Miles, R.E., Snow, C.C. 1978. **Organizational strategy, structure, and process.** New York: McGraw-Hill.

20. Miles, R.E. Snow, C.C. 1984. *Designing strategic human resource systems.* **Organizational Dynamics,** 31(1): 36-52

21. Pfeffer, J. 1998 **The Human Equation**. Boston, Harvard Business School Press.

22. Pfeffer, J, Sutton, R.I., 2000. **The Knowing-Doing Gap: How Smart Companies Turn Knowledge into Action.**, Boston, Harvard Business School Press.

23. Porter, M.E. 1985. **Competitive Advantage: Creating and sustaining superior performance.** New York: Free Press.

24. Porter, M.E. 1996. *What is strategy?* **Harvard Business Review,** November-December, 61-78

Prahalad, C. , Hamel, G. 1990. *The core competence of the corporation.* **Harvard Business Review,** May-June, 68(3): 79-91.

25. Ryan, K.D., Oestreich, D.K. 1991. **Driving Fear out of the Workplace: How to Overcome the Invisible Barriers to Quality, Productivity, and Innovation**. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991.

26. Sathe, V. 1983. *Implications of Corporate Culture: A manager's guide to action.* **Organizational Dynamics, 12(2).** 5-23

27. Schein, E. 1985. **Organizational culture and leadership.** San Francisco, Jossey-Bass

28. Schuler, R.S.1992. *Strategic human resource management: Linking people with the strategic needs of the business.* **Organizational Dynamics,** 21(1): 18-31.

29. Schwartz, H., Davis, S.M. 1981. *Matching corporate culture and business strategy.* **Organizational Dynamics,** Summer. 30-48

30. Siehl, C., Martin, J. 1990. *Organizational culture: A key to financial performance?* In **Organizational Climate and Culture,** B. Schneider, ed. 1990, Jossey-Bass.

31. Tate, C.F. 2002. *How boards foster an atmosphere that inspires trust and credibility.* **Association Management**. 54(8), Aug. 85-95

32. Webster, C. 1993. *Refinement of the marketing culture scale and the relationship between marketing culture and the profitability of a service firm.* **Journal of Business Research,** New Yoir, 26 (2), 111-132